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JIMINY CRICKET FOR THE CORPORATION: 
UNDERSTANDING THE CORPORATE 
“CONSCIENCE” 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Disney’s classic retelling of the fable Pinocchio, soon after being 
granted life by the Blue Fairy, Geppetto’s wooden boy is assigned a 
conscience in the form of the talking insect, Jiminy Cricket.1  The 
implication of this assignment is clear; as Pinocchio is not yet a real boy, 
he does not possess a conscience and must rely on an external voice, 
such as Jiminy Cricket, to tell him what is right from wrong. 
Throughout the movie, Pinocchio gets into a number of misadventures 
including some debacles resulting from ignoring his assigned conscience 
(including one in which he is half-transformed into an ass).2 
In this sense, Pinocchio makes an appropriate analogy for the 
modern American for-profit corporation.  Like Pinocchio, the 
corporation is an artificial entity created by humans.  It is then given 
“life,” so to speak, by the states and interacts with the individuals and 
society around it.  And like Pinocchio, corporations have often found 
themselves embroiled in misadventures, seemingly from acting without 
a conscience.  Other commentators have characterized corporations as 
soulless,3 analogizing them to the tin man of the Wizard of Oz4 (who has 
no heart) or the Jewish Golem, which can only mindlessly carry-out the 
instructions slipped into its mouth on a piece of paper.5  But are 
corporations truly without any sort of conscience or do they also have a 
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attorney-client privilege.  The author would like to acknowledge the hard work and 
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writing this Article, as well as to thank Professor Reynaldo Valencia of St. Mary’s 
University School of Law for his support and feedback.  The author would also like to 
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1 See generally PINOCCHIO (Walt Disney Pictures 1940). 
2 See id. 
3 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 134 (3d ed. 2005). 
4 Lawrence E. Mitchell & Theresa A. Gabaldon, If I Only Had a Heart: Or, How Can We 
Identify a Corporate Morality, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1645, 1646-47 (2002). 
5 LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA’S NEWEST EXPORT 44 
(2001); RALPH ESTES, TYRANNY OF THE BOTTOM LINE: WHY CORPORATIONS MAKE GOOD 
PEOPLE DO BAD THINGS 21 (1996). 
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“Jiminy Cricket”–an external voice that influences them to act in a way 
that could be deemed “right” or “good?”  The question is a difficult one, 
in part because defining what is “right” is such a subjective task. 
However, if we view corporate behavior more broadly, to turn the 
question to what causes corporations to engage in conduct that benefits 
society, we understand that some external force or forces must direct the 
corporation.  This Article seeks to analyze the external forces that curb or 
drive corporate behavior as they relate to activities that benefit society in 
the context of having a “conscience.” 
Part II of this Article examines the corporation from a historical 
perspective, tracking its evolution from a small number of specially 
chartered organizations with a limited, publicly oriented purpose, to the 
modern, highly regulated profit-making organizations of today.  Part III 
examines whether the modern corporation can have a conscience and 
what that term means with regard to such an artificial entity.  Part IV 
identifies three driving forces behind what will be termed corporate 
behavior that is beneficial to society: behavior driven by legal 
compliance; behavior that also benefits the corporation; and, behavior 
that is seemingly driven by altruistic (or semi-altruistic) motives.  Part V 
reflects upon how these categories can be used to evaluate corporate 
behavior. 
II. EVOLVING PURPOSE OF THE CORPORATION
Before delving into the task of categorizing the basis of corporate 
behavior, it is useful to reflect upon how the modern corporation 
evolved in America.  This is more than a mere academic exercise as it is 
important to understand what role the corporation has played in 
American history to understand its current status.6  And, as we will see, 
this status is essential to understanding what drives corporate behavior. 
A. Historical Underpinnings of the Corporation 
Though the earliest forms of the corporation can be traced as far back 
as Roman times,7 it did not begin to take on its current form in America 
until the mid-to-late nineteenth century with the emergence of general 
6 See, e.g., Sarah H. Duggin & Stephen M. Goldman, Restoring Trust in Corporate 
Directors: The Disney Standard and the “New” Good Faith, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 211, 219 (2006) 
(reviewing the development of the corporation in America to explain how the law has 
struggled with holding directors accountable). 
7 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 
§ 1 at 3 (Carol A. Jones ed., 2006); Douglas Arner, Development of the American Law of
Corporations to 1832, 55 S.M.U. L. REV. 23, 25 (2002). 
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incorporation statutes.8  The earliest forms of the corporation in America 
came by specific charters from the states in the late eighteenth century, 
which were carried-over from the colonial days when corporations 
obtained charters directly from the King of England.9  Corporations were 
formed with limited purposes and even time limits within which they 
could operate.10  The typical corporation would be formed to complete 
some specific task, such as to build a canal or bridge, and would only be 
given a charter for a period of five, twenty, or thirty years.11  The number 
of corporations was also extremely limited, with only 335 granted in the 
entire eighteenth century, 181 of which were granted between 1796 and 
1800.12  Most of these were chartered for some specific aspect of the 
public good, such as building utilities, and very few were for 
manufacturing purposes.13 
The early limitations placed upon corporations were in large part a 
result of the inherent distrust that the public had for the corporation.14  
Corporations at that time were monopolistic by their very nature 
because they maintained exclusive control over some public asset or 
business opportunity.15  There were also concerns over the concentration 
of wealth that was centered in a corporation.16  As Justice Brandeis 
recounted in his dissent in the chain store tax case of Louis K. Liggett Co. 
v. Leeu,17
There was a sense of some insidious menace inherent in 
large aggregations of capital, particularly when held by 
corporations.  So at first the corporate privilege was 
8 FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 130, 390; Susan P. Hamill, From Special Privilege to General 
Utility: A Continuation of Willard Hurst’s Study of Corporations, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 81, 84-85, 
104-06 (1999). 
9 Hamill, supra note 8, at 88 (“Corporations always have been creatures of statute, 
requiring a formal recognition normally evidenced by a corporate charter issued by a 
sovereign person or government.”) (citation omitted); see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 
129-30. 
10 FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 131-32. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 129; FLETCHER, supra note 7, § 2 at 8 (“The cloud of disfavor under which 
corporations labored in America was not dissipated until near the end of the eighteenth 
century, and during the last 11 years of that period, the total number of charters granted 
did not exceed 200.”). 
13 FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 130-32, 134 (noting that a “mere handful” of these early 
corporations were established for manufacturing purposes); ESTES, supra note 5, at 22-24. 
14 FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 132. 
15 Id. 
16 Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 549 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
17 288 U.S. 517 (1933). 
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granted sparingly; and only when the grant seemed 
necessary in order to procure for the community some 
specific benefit otherwise unattainable.18 
However, while public suspicion of corporations may have 
remained,19 economic necessity altered the limited grant of the corporate 
privilege in the nineteenth century. 
One of the most significant changes was the shift of granting 
corporate status via special charter by the state legislatures to the 
enactment of general incorporation statutes.  At the start of the 
nineteenth century, corporations were still relatively rare, and the special 
charter system made sense.20  However, as the country grew, the practice 
of issuing special charters became burdensome.21  As legal historian 
Lawrence Friedman describes, 
In theory, the special charter system was a good way to 
control corporations.  But the demand for charters, in the 
end, got to be too heavy.  By the 1840s and 1850s, it 
would have swamped the legislatures, if the process had 
not become so routine.  Even so, state session laws 
bulged with special charters.  Time was wasted in the 
drudge work of issuing, amending, and extending 
hundreds of charters.  In the rush, there was little time to 
supervise those charters that perhaps needed 
supervision.22 
To combat this problem, states began enacting general incorporation 
statutes.23  In 1809, Massachusetts passed a general incorporation act for 
manufacturing companies, and New York soon followed with its own 
general incorporation statute in 1811.24  By the 1850s, over twenty states 
18 Id. at 549 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
19 Id. 
20 FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 134. 
21 Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business 
Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 426 (2003) (noting that by the 
1820s, demand by business people for corporate charters was growing rapidly). 
22 FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 134. 
23 Id.; Blair, supra note 21, at 425-26. 
24 Blair, supra note 21, at 425-26; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 134 (noting that New 
York is generally credited as the first to enact a general incorporation law for business 
corporations). 
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had passed general incorporation statutes,25 and by 1875, general 
incorporation laws were available in virtually every state.26 
Though general incorporation laws were available, the special 
charter system did not entirely disappear, and, indeed, many 
incorporators still chose the special charter route.27  Although most every 
state had a general incorporation statute or law by 1875, only eighteen 
states had prohibited special charters.28  The reasons for electing to 
incorporate by special charter varied from concerns over the prestige of 
being incorporated under a general incorporation statute to more seedy 
motives, such as securing favorable arrangements from the state that 
would not be available to others.29  Ultimately, concerns over such 
behavior and a weakening of confidence in public officials led to state 
constitutional prohibitions on special charters.30 However, the practice 
continued in many states early into the twentieth century.31 
During the nineteenth century, the corporate form as we know it 
today also began to take shape.  The basic characteristics of a 
corporation—entity status with perpetual life, separation of ownership 
from management and limited liability—all began to take hold in the 
minds of American jurists and scholars.32  The view of the corporation 
was expressed early in the nineteenth century by Justice Marshall in the 
seminal case of Dartmouth College v. Woodward.33  In Dartmouth College, 
the Supreme Court was faced with whether the state of New Hampshire 
could unilaterally alter the charter originally granted to Dartmouth 
College’s trustees by the British Crown in 1769.34  In 1816, New 
Hampshire passed an act which attempted to transform Dartmouth 
College into Dartmouth University.35  The most significant part of the act 
altered the mode of governance provided in the college’s original charter 
by increasing the size of the board of trustees from twelve to twenty-one 
and provided that the new members would be appointed by the 
25 Blair, supra note 21, at 426. 
26 Hamill, supra note 8, at 123. 
27 FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 135. 
28 Hamill, supra note 8, at 123. 
29 Id.; FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 135 (commenting that “[t]here were unscrupulous 
incorporators, and there were recurrent bribery scandals.”). 
30 FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 135; Hamill, supra note 8, at 123-27. 
31 Hamill, supra note 8, at 127-29. 
32 FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 135; HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN 
LAW 1836-1937 49-50 (1991); Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819). 
33 17 U.S. 518 (1819). 
34 Id. at 624-26. 
35 Id. at 626. 
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governor.36  The existing trustees objected and brought suit, claiming 
that the New Hampshire act violated the Contract Clause of the United 
States Constitution.37 
The Supreme Court agreed with the trustees and found that the 
charter was in fact a contract between Dartmouth College and the state.38  
In the course of his analysis, Justice Marshall set forth what it meant 
legally to be a corporation, stating: 
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, 
and existing only in contemplation of law.  Being the 
mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties 
which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either 
expressly or as incidental to its very existence.  These are 
such as are supposed best calculated to effect the object 
for which it was created.  Among the most important are 
immortality, and, if the expression may be allowed, 
individuality; properties, by which a perpetual 
succession of many persons are considered as the same, 
and may act as a single individual.  They enable a 
corporation to manage its own affairs, and to hold 
property without the perplexing intricacies, the 
hazardous and endless necessity, of perpetual 
conveyance for the purpose of transmitting it from hand 
to hand. . . . By these means, a perpetual succession of 
individuals are capable of acting for the promotion of 
the particular object, like one immortal being.  But this 
being does not share in the civil government of the 
country, unless that be the purpose for which it is 
created.  Its immortality no more confers on it political 
power, or a political character, than immortality would 
confer such power or character on a natural person.  It is 
no more a state instrument than a natural person 
exercising the same powers would be.39 
36 Id.; R. Kent Newmyer, John Marshall as a Transitional Jurist: Dartmouth College v. 
Woodward and the Limits of Omniscient Judging, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1665, 1666 (2000). 
37 Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 626-27. 
38 Id. at 627 (“It can require no argument to prove that the circumstances of this case 
constitute a contract.”). 
39 Id. at 636. 
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Justice Marshall’s opinion essentially became the starting point for 
the developing law of corporations.40  Though the decision in Dartmouth 
College did not specifically analyze a business corporation, the result was 
understood to go beyond simply a small college charter.41  The Court’s 
ultimate conclusion was that a charter was a valid contract that could not 
be unilaterally altered by the state in violation of the Contract Clause, 
just as the state could not unilaterally alter a contract with an 
individual.42 
While some predicted that the Dartmouth College case signified a 
sweeping change in the relationship between the state and the 
corporation, its effect on corporate law turned out to be less significant.43  
As Justice Story had pointed out in his concurrence in Dartmouth College, 
if the state wished to alter the terms of a corporate charter after granting 
such charter, such authority “must be reserved in the grant.”44  
Apparently, the states took this advice to heart, as it soon became a part 
of multiple state incorporation statutes.45  Although this effectively 
overruled Dartmouth College, in actuality, the states exercised little 
control over their corporate creations.46  This is not surprising because 
the very nature of general incorporation and the subsequent increased 
number of corporations militated against the state legislatures’ ability to 
regulate individually each corporation it created.47  By the close of the 
40 See Gregory A. Mark, The Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1441, 1450 (1987) (noting that the language and structure of Justice 
Marshall’s opinion were followed throughout the nineteenth century); Arner, supra note 7, 
at 50 (stating that Marshall’s opinion, as modified by Justice Story’s concurrence, became 
the “starting point by Joseph Angell and Samuel Ames in their Treatise on the Law of 
Private Corporations Aggregate”) (citation omitted). 
41 FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 136. 
42 Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 643-46. 
43 FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 137. 
44 Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 712 (Story, J. concurring). 
In my judgment it is perfectly clear that any act of a legislature which 
takes away any powers or franchises vested by its charter in a private 
corporation or its corporate officers, or which restrains or controls the 
legitimate exercise of them, or transfers them to other persons, without 
its assent, is a violation of the obligations of that charter.  If the 
legislature mean[s] [sic] to claim such an authority, it must be reserved in 
the grant. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
45 FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 137; Mark, supra note 40, at 1454 (“The legislatures 
immediately began to include clauses reserving to the state the power to amend or repeal 
the charters that they granted.”). 
46 Mark, supra note 40, at 1454 . 
47 Id. 
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nineteenth century, charter-based regulation had failed, and corporate 
behavior began to be governed by more general regulations.48 
B. The Development of Corporate Law in the Late Nineteenth and Twentieth 
Centuries 
With the advent of the corporation transforming from a special 
franchise of the state to a private business organization, state control 
over each individual corporation diminished.49  By the close of the 
nineteenth century, shareholders, rather than the state, became 
responsible for disciplining corporate managers and directors, but the 
standard of manager behavior had gradually declined throughout the 
nineteenth century.50  As Herbert Hovenkamp recounts, “by 1890 those 
in control of the corporation were legally answerable for virtually 
nothing but illegality, clearly ultra vires acts . . . or gross negligence.”51  
The environment for investors was also turbulent in the late nineteenth 
century.  As Lawrence Friedman describes, “[t]he investment market 
was totally unregulated; no SEC [Security Exchange Commission] kept it 
honest, and the level of morality among promoters was painfully low, to 
put it mildly. . . . The investing public was unmercifully fleeced.”52  
However, this would all soon change. 
1. The Curbing of Corporate Behavior
Throughout the late nineteenth century and continuing through to
modern day, much of corporate law was developed through a pattern of 
public outcry followed by legislative action.  In some cases, this was 
precipitated by a single event, while in other cases, a general distrust of 
corporate power initiated the action.  An example of the latter can be 
found in the development of the antitrust laws. 
At the close of the nineteenth century, there was a growing distrust 
of the amount of power held by corporations.53  The growth of major 
corporations after the Civil War increased the long-held fear of 
monopoly amongst the public, particularly amongst farmers, workers, 
and small businessmen.54  In response to these fears, the Sherman Act 
48 Id. at 1445; HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, at 56. 
49 HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, at 56. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 391; Duggin & Goldman, supra note 6, at 222 (quoting 
Friedman). 
53 FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 346. 
54 FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 346; HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, at 241. 
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was passed as a means of breaking-up the so-called “trusts” which were 
viewed as restricting trade and competition.55  The Sherman Act’s early 
history was shaky, with courts narrowly interpreting the Act.56  
However, under President Theodore Roosevelt, enforcement of the Act 
received a boost, and subsequent victories in the Supreme Court as well 
as the establishment of the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and 
passage of the Clayton Act helped to transform the antitrust laws into 
meaningful regulations.57  Today, antitrust concerns are not near the 
level of hysteria that evoked the regulation, but the laws have more of a 
real effect.58  As Lawrence Friedman has noted, early in American history 
individuals such as “John D. Rockefeller could swallow up competitors 
at will; the modern merger barons must humbly beg permission.”59 
While the antitrust movement was in reaction to a fear of the 
economic power of the corporation, more often corporate law developed 
as a reaction to everyday corporate behavior.60  A classic example is in 
the development of the food and drug laws.  While individual states had 
their own regulations, Congress was compelled to pass such laws in the 
wake of Upton Sinclair’s 1906 novel The Jungle, which described in 
graphic detail the hellish conditions of meatpacking plants in Chicago.61  
The novel generated such disgust and public outcry that President 
Theodore Roosevelt hired investigators, who confirmed much of the 
novel, and the Food and Drug Act swiftly sailed through Congress.62 
This pattern of curbing unethical corporate behavior continued 
throughout the twentieth century.63  For example, around the same time 
as the Food and Drug Act’s passage, Congress passed worker’s 
compensation and safety regulation laws, largely in reaction to safety 
concerns over the operation of the railroads.64  Additionally, the 
55 Id.  As Friedman notes, the use of the word “trust” was a vestige, as holding 
companies were actually used, rather than trusts, to put monopolies together.  Id. 
56 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH CENTURY 55 (2002) [hereinafter 
“FRIEDMAN, 20TH CENTURY”]. 
57 Id. at 55-59; FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 349. 
58 FRIEDMAN, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 56, at 392-93. 
59 FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 349. 
60 FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 392 (“The law of corporation, as such, deals less with the 
economic power of corporations than with their everyday behavior.”). 
61 FRIEDMAN, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 56, at 60-61; see also U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration, The 1906 Food and Drugs Act and Its Enforcement, available at 
http://www.fda.gov/oc/historyoffda/section1.html (crediting Sinclair’s book as the final 
precipitating force behind a comprehensive food and drug law). 
62 FRIEDMAN, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 56, at 60-61. 
63 FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 559-61. 
64 FRIEDMAN, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 56, at 62. 
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Securities Act of 193365 and the Securities Exchange Act of 193466 were 
enacted to address abuses in the issuance and trading of securities, 
which were seen as helping to cause the great stock market crash of 
1929.67  More recently, much of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed as a 
response to the latest spate of corporate scandals that plagued the 
beginning of the twenty-first century.68  A general theme that seems to 
have developed through these regulations is that corporations cannot be 
trusted to police or regulate themselves, and, therefore, external 
pressures must be applied. 
2. The Relationship between Management and Shareholders
At the close of the nineteenth century, corporate managers and
directors were virtually answerable for nothing short of illegal or ultra 
vires acts.  However, beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, courts 
began to recognize a method by which shareholders could sue the 
corporate directors—the derivative suit.  The derivative suit, or 
stockholder’s suit, is an action typically brought by shareholders on 
behalf of the corporation against “a third party (usu[ally] a corporate 
officer) because of the corporation’s failure to take some action against 
the third party.” 69  Shareholder challenges to ultra vires acts were first 
recognized in the 1830s and 1840s, but the derivative suit did not begin 
to emerge until the 1850s.70  Eventually, as ultra vires challenges became 
less relevant,71 the derivative suits began to focus on the duties owed by 
the directors of a corporation. 
The derivative suit as it relates to the duties owed to the 
shareholders by corporate directors initially emerged from the law of 
trusts.72  The basis of the relationship was that corporate management 
65 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a-77aa (West 2006). 
66 Id. at §§ 78a-78mm. 
67 Duggin & Goldman, supra note 6, at 222; Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Capital Gains 
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (“A fundamental purpose, common to these 
statutes, was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor 
and thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry.”). 
68 Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection: Invigorating Incentives for Sarbanes-Oxley 
Corporate and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REV. 91, 92 (2007). 
69 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 475 (8th ed. 2004); Model Business Corporation Act § 7.40(1) 
(2003) (“‘Derivative proceeding’ mean[s] a civil suit in the right of a domestic 
corporation . . . .”); see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 393; LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & PETER V. 
LETSOU, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 514 (4th ed. 2003). 
70 HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, at 60-61; FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 393 (noting that the 
concept received a “push” by the Supreme Court in Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. 331 (1856)). 
71 FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 396. 
72 Duggin & Goldman, supra note 6, at 223. 
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was a trustee, or guardian, of every shareholder and thus was bound by 
a fiduciary duty to the corporation and its shareholders.73  As the trustee 
model evolved, this fiduciary obligation emerged as having two basic 
components: a duty of loyalty and a duty of care.74  The duty of loyalty 
required that the directors place the corporation before their own 
interests,75 but the duty of care was more difficult to define as courts 
struggled with what level of discretion corporate managers should be 
given in running the company.76  The ultimate standard that emerged 
was the business judgment rule. 
The business judgment rule essentially frees management to run the 
corporation as it sees fit.77  Under the rule, directors cannot be held liable 
to shareholders for mere errors in judgment, no matter how gross, so 
long as the decisions were made in good faith and in the ordinary course 
of business.78  The effect of the rule is that it prevents courts and 
shareholders from second-guessing the business decisions of directors.79  
The interplay of the duty of care and the limits of the business judgment 
rule are well illustrated in the case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.80 
In Dodge, the plaintiffs, primarily led by brothers John and Horace 
Dodge, who were minority shareholders in Ford Motor Company, 
brought suit against the directors.81  Prior to the suit, Ford had enjoyed 
many years of success which enabled Ford to pay special dividends 
totaling $41 million from December, 1911, through October, 1915, as well 
as a regular dividend of five percent per month on the existing $2 million 
capital.82  However, in 1916, Henry Ford, who owned 58% of the Ford 
Motor Company stock, declared that no more special dividends would 
be paid and that the earnings would instead be put back into the 
company.83  Henry Ford announced his motives in a press release to the 
city of Detroit, stating, 
73 Id.; FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 393. 
74 Duggin & Goldman, supra note 6, at 224. 
75 Id.; Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (describing the duty of loyalty 
as requiring “the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive.”). 
76 HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, at 62 (“During the second half of the [nineteenth] century 
a deep division emerged in state courts over the appropriate standard for directors’ 
exercise of their business judgment.”). 
77 FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 396. 
78 HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, at 62; FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 396. 
79 Duggin & Goldman, supra note 6, at 225. 
80 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
81 Id. at 669. 
82 Id. at 670. 
83 Id. at 671. 
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My ambition . . .  is to employ still more men; to spread 
the benefits of this industrial system to the greatest 
possible number, to help them build up their lives and 
their homes. To do this, we are putting the greatest share 
of our profits back into the business.84 
Based on this and other comments by Henry Ford, the plaintiffs sued 
to enjoin Ford from expanding its operations by building a smelting 
plant and to compel Ford to issue a special dividend of 75% of the $54 
million surplus.85  After a hearing, the lower court agreed with the 
plaintiffs, enjoined Ford Motor Company’s use of the surplus to expand 
its operations, and ordered a special dividend to be issued.86 
On appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs’ 
claims that Ford Motor Company had illegally expanded beyond the 
authorized amount of capital provided by statute and also rejected the 
plaintiffs’ claim that the expansion of the corporation’s business into a 
smelting plant was ultra vires.87  However, the court initially seemed 
sympathetic to the plaintiffs’ claims that Ford’s expansion and 
withholding of special dividends was primarily for humanitarian, rather 
than business reasons.88  In reviewing Henry Ford’s testimony and legal 
precedence, the court stated: 
His testimony creates the impression, also, that he thinks 
the Ford Motor Company has made too much money, 
has had too large profits, and that, although large profits 
might be still earned, a sharing of them with the public, 
by reducing the price of the output of the company, 
ought to be undertaken.  We have no doubt that certain 
sentiments, philanthropic and altruistic, creditable to 
Mr. Ford, had large influence in determining the policy 
to be pursued by the Ford Motor Company–the policy 
which has been herein referred to. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 672-74. 
86 Id. 677-78. 
87 Id. at 679-81.  At the time, Michigan had in effect a statute limiting the amount of 
capital stock for a corporation organizing under Michigan law to $25 million, which was 
later increased to $50 million.  Id. at 679-80.  The Michigan Supreme Court found that the 
statute did not limit the amount of capital a corporation could amass after formation.  Id. at 
680. 
88 Id. at 683 (“It is the contention of plaintiffs that the apparent effect of the plan is 
intended to be . . . to continue the corporation henceforth as a semi-eleemosynary 
institution and not as a business institution.”). 
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. . . . 
There should be no confusion (of which there is 
evidence) of the duties which Mr. Ford conceives that he 
and the stockholders owe to the general public and the 
duties which in law he and his codirectors owe to 
protesting, minority stockholders.  A business 
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the 
profit of the stockholders.  The powers of the directors 
are to be employed for that end.  The discretion of 
directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to 
attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the 
end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the 
nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order 
to devote them to other purposes.89 
Despite this statement, however, the court went on to reverse the 
lower court’s injunction on the expansion of Ford’s business operations, 
holding that the court should not “interfere with the proposed expansion 
of the business. . . . The judges are not business experts.”90  In upholding 
the directors’ decision to expand, the court noted that this goal did not 
appear to harm the interests of the shareholders.91  Though the court 
reversed the injunction, it did affirm a portion of the trial court’s order 
requiring a distribution of approximately $20 million of the cash surplus, 
finding that even with some of the money being diverted to the 
expansion of operations, the surplus was great enough that it was the 
directors’ duty to distribute “a very large sum of money to stockholders” 
in the form of a dividend.92  Thus, the Dodge case demonstrates both the 
duty of care owed by corporate directors–through the affirmation of the 
special dividend–and the application of the business judgment rule–
through the reversal of the injunction against expansion.93 
89 Id. at 683-84. 
90 Id. at 684. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 685 (citations omitted). 
93 As an interesting side note, some of Ford’s motives may not have been as altruistic as 
articulated.  The principle plaintiffs in the case, the Dodge brothers, were originally the 
manufacturers of the Ford chassis but in 1912, Ford started making its own chassis.  
RIBSTEIN & LETSOU, supra note 69, at 383.  It appears Ford was attempting to undercut the 
prices of his stockholders and competitors as well as deny them dividends which were in 
effect helping fund the competition.  After this case, Ford announced he would sell a $250 
automobile and was then able to purchase the Dodge brothers’ stock for $25 million (down 
$10 million from the Dodge brothers’ initial asking price).  Id. 
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While the business judgment rule was applied in Dodge to justify 
expenditures on business expansion, the rule has been applied in a 
variety of other areas.  As one commentator has noted: 
Pursuant to the Rule, courts generally defer to decisions 
taken by corporate directors, whether they relate to 
mergers and acquisitions, paying out of dividends, 
charitable donations, or executive compensation, as long 
as: (1) a business decision was made, (2) in good faith, 
(3) after the director reasonably informed herself, and (4) 
the director had no financial interest in the decision at 
issue.94 
While courts continue to struggle with the exact application of the 
business judgment rule,95 the result, in most cases, is that corporate 
management is, at least legally, not liable for its good faith business 
decisions.  This liberalization of the business judgment rule gave 
relatively more discretion to the corporate managers than to the 
shareholders who technically owned the company.96 
This phenomenon was famously announced by Adolph Berle and 
Gardiner Means in their 1932 book, The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property.97  The Berle-Means thesis argued that the sharp division 
between corporate ownership and control led to management becoming 
the effective owners of a corporation.98  The implicit economic problem 
of the thesis is that corporate managers could act in their own self-
interests or for some purpose other than profit maximization and thus 
not in the interest of the owners of the corporation, i.e. the shareholders.99  
Minority shareholders of large corporations could not efficiently monitor 
the managers; thus, such abuses could go unchecked.100  This concern 
helped bring about federal reforms such as the federal proxy 
94 D.A. Jeremy Telman, The Business Judgment Rule, Disclosure, and Executive 
Compensation, 81 TUL. L. REV. 829, 831-32 (2007) (internal citations omitted). 
95 Id. at 833-39 (noting the confusion over the business judgment rule as either an 
evidentiary presumption, standard of review, or abstention doctrine); see also Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 84 (2004). 
96 HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, at 63. 
97 ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 119-25 (17th prtg. 1950); FRIEDMAN, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 56, at 390. 
98 BERELE & MEANS, supra note 97, at 119-25; FRIEDMAN, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 56, at 
390. 
99 RIBSTEIN & LETSOU, supra note 69, at 254-55; FRIEDMAN, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 56, 
at 390; HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, at 306. 
100 RIBSTEIN & LETSOU, supra note 69, at 255. 
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regulations.101  However, while the Berle-Means thesis remains a widely 
cited work, it is also the subject of criticism.102  Shareholders are not 
entirely powerless, as Lawrence Freidman has noted, because they “can 
vote with their feet, so to speak; and when share prices fall, and 
stockholders sell, management is in deep, deep trouble.”103  As will be 
discussed below, this concern for share price and profit is a limiting 
factor on corporate managers who wish to spend the firm’s money on 
charitable causes.104 
III. DEFINING “CONSCIENCE” AS IT RELATES TO “GOOD” BEHAVIOR
With a firm grasp of the corporation’s historical roots and evolution, 
we can turn to the task of understanding what it means for a corporation 
to have a “conscience.”  Black’s Dictionary defines “conscience” as: 
“[t]he moral sense; the faculty of judging the moral qualities of actions, 
or of discriminating between right and wrong; . . . [t]he sense of right 
and wrong inherent in every person by virtue of his existence as a social 
entity; good conscience being a synonym of equity.”105  Webster’s offers 
a slightly different definition: “knowledge or feeling of right and wrong; 
the faculty, power, or principle of a person which decides on the 
lawfulness or unlawfulness of his actions, with a compulsion to do right; 
moral judgment that prohibits or opposes the violation of a previously 
recognized ethical principle.”106  From these definitions we can glean a 
couple of themes: (1) a conscience involves the ability to make a choice 
based on a moral sense or feeling; and (2) a conscience involves the 
ability to determine right from wrong and comport behavior 
accordingly.  These themes pose some interesting hurdles when 
applying the term to a corporation.  First, given that the quality of 
having a moral sense or feeling is generally human, can it even be 
applied to a non-human corporation?  And, given the subjective nature 
of right and wrong, what does it mean for a corporation to choose 
“right?” 
101 Id. at 269. 
102 William W. Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century’s Turn, 26 J. CORP. L. 
737, 737-38, 754-55 (2000); FRIEDMAN, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 56, at 390. 
103 FRIEDMAN, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 56, at 390. 
104 See infra Part III. 
105 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 209 (6th ed. 1991).  Interestingly, the more recent eighth 
edition of Black’s Law Dictionary is less nuanced, defining “conscience” more concisely as 
“[t]he moral sense of right or wrong; esp., a moral sense applied to one’s own judgment 
and actions.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 322 (8th ed. 2004).  I have chosen to use the more 
detailed definition provided in the sixth edition. 
106 WEBSTER’S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 387 (2d ed. 1979). 
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A. Can Corporations Make “Conscience” Choices? 
Most definitions of a “conscience” involve a uniquely human 
characteristic to determine right from wrong based on an internal 
“feeling” or “moral sense.”  But, corporations are obviously not human. 
Indeed, from their inception, corporations have been viewed by the 
public as soulless.107  It has been feared that a corporation’s perpetual 
life, large size, and limited liability could act to “aggregate the worst 
urges of whole groups of men,” with no sense of morality to temper its 
powers.108  Lawrence Mitchell has analogized the corporation to Rabbi 
Judah Loew’s Golem, stating that, like the Golem, “which came to life to 
protect the Jewish people once the right words were inserted into its ear, 
the modern American corporation knows only one thing [profit 
maximization]. . . . So we have the paradox of having created an artificial 
creature with all of the rights of natural persons to formulate and pursue 
ends that give its life meaning, but without the ability to choose and 
pursue those ends.”109  Or, if we return to the analogy at the beginning of 
this Article, the corporation is akin to Pinocchio, in that it is an artificial 
entity, created by man.110  However, even if a corporation is “soulless,” it 
is made up of and run by human beings.111  And, though the corporation 
does not have a “conscience” in the traditional sense,112 clearly, 
corporations do make choices that have an impact, positive or negative, 
on society. 
107 FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 134. 
108 Id. 
109 MITCHELL, supra note 5, at 44. 
110 See id. at 43 (“[Corporations] are special kinds of people; people created not by God 
but by law and humans.  As such, and in contrast to the Enlightenment vision of 
autonomous man, they have only the ends given to them by their creators.”). 
111 FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 134; Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business, in 
THE ESSENCE OF FRIEDMAN 36-37 (Kurt R. Leube ed., 1987) (noting that corporate 
responsible behavior must refer to the corporate executives); see also MITCHELL, supra note 
5, at 13, 43-44. 
112 Cf. Friedman, supra note 111, at 36.  Milton Friedman, in discussing whether 
“business” can have responsibilities, urges that they cannot, at least not in the traditional 
sense, stating: 
What does it mean to say that “business” has responsibilities?  Only 
people can have responsibilities.  A corporation is an artificial person 
and in this sense may have artificial responsibilities, but “business” as 
a whole cannot be said to have responsibilities, even in this vague 
sense. 
Id. 
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1. The Individual in the Corporation
So, are these choices driven purely by the whims and conscience of 
management?  Probably not, as corporate managers can still be held 
accountable for their actions.  Though an individual may wish to act 
generously with corporate funds, he or she cannot treat corporate 
monies and possessions as his or her own.113  For instance, in Worthington 
v. Worthington,114 Henry R. Worthington, president of a corporation
which manufactured and sold hydraulic machinery, agreed to donate 
equipment to Columbia University’s hydraulic laboratory.115  In a letter 
agreeing to the donation, Henry Worthington used language that 
appeared to indicate that he personally was willing to donate the 
machinery and asked that the donation be identified with his father’s 
name.116  The corporation sued to recover the value of the equipment 
from Henry Worthington, claiming the donation was not an authorized 
expenditure.117  The court agreed, finding that despite Henry 
Worthington’s being president and a large shareholder, he could not, 
“by virtue of his office, give away the [corporation’s] property.”118  The 
court clearly took issue with the express individual gratification Henry 
Worthington received from the donation as articulated by his own words 
in a letter to Columbia University.119 
113 See, e.g., Rice v. Wheeling Dollar Sav. & Trust Co., 130 N.E.2d 442, 449 (Ohio C.P. 1954) 
(holding that contribution, at insistence of officers and directors, to a charitable corporation 
in memory of president’s mother without notification to all shareholders, was an 
unsanctioned use of corporate funds).  Cf. Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 
398, 403-04 (Del. Ch. 1969) (holding that where president placed his own interest above that 
of the company’s by selling a stock exchange seat previously purchased with corporate 
funds for personal profit, president was accountable to the company for the profit made).  
Though the Theodora court found that the business judgment rule did not protect the 
president for the sale of a stock exchange seat at a personal profit, it held the rule did 
protect a large gift made to a charitable foundation.  Id. at 405. 
114 Henry R. Worthington v. Worthington, 91 N.Y.S. 443 (N.Y. App. Div. 1905). 
115 Id. at 444-45. 
116 Id. at 444. 
117 Id. at 445. 
118 Id. at 444-45. 
119 Id. at 445. 
It was a laudable and commendable thing for the defendant to make 
the gift, not only for the purpose of promulgating knowledge in 
mechanical engineering, but in perpetuating his father’s memory. In 
doing this, however, he was obligated to use his own property, and not 
that of another. . . . [T]here is nothing in the record which would justify 
a finding that any action was taken by the corporation which could be 
construed into its giving the materials and making the expenditure as a 
gift. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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What may have played an even larger role in the decision, however, 
was the failure to have the corporation approve and endorse the action, 
so that the donation would appear to be one based upon the business 
judgment of the corporation.120  Indeed, in other scenarios, even when 
the benefit to the corporation has been speculative, courts have been 
reluctant to intervene with the business affairs of a corporation.  An 
example of such reluctance can be seen in the oft-cited case of Shlensky v. 
Wrigley.121  In Shlensky, the plaintiff, a minority shareholder of the 
Chicago National League Ball Club (which operated the Cub’s home 
baseball park of Wrigley Field), sued the directors for failing to install 
lights at Wrigley Field so that night games could be played.122  For those 
unfamiliar with baseball, Wrigley Field was, at the time of the lawsuit, as 
it is today, located in a heavily residential neighborhood on the north 
side of Chicago.123  At the time of the suit, Wrigley Field was the only 
major league park not equipped with lights, and so night games could 
not be played.124  The plaintiff alleged that the decision not to install 
lights was costing the corporation revenues that would have resulted 
from the increase in attendance of night games, and that the decision not 
to install the lights was not based on financial welfare or interests of the 
corporation.125  Instead, the plaintiff claimed the decision was based on 
the personal position of the president, Philip K. Wrigley, that the 
installation of lights and night baseball games would have a 
“deteriorating effect upon the surrounding neighborhood.”126  Despite 
these allegations, the appellate court refused to reverse the trial court’s 
dismissal of the case, based in part upon the business judgment rule.127  
Instead, the court found that the directors’ actions could be consistent 
with the best interests of the corporation, stating, 
[W]e are not satisfied that the motives assigned to Philip 
K. Wrigley, and through him to the other directors, are 
contrary to the best interests of the corporation and the 
stockholders.  For example, it appears to us that the 
effect on the surrounding neighborhood might well be 
120 Id.; see also In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967-68 (Del. Ch. 
1996) (noting that the business judgment rule is process oriented). 
121 Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968). 
122 Id. at 777. 
123 RIBSTEIN & LETSOU, supra note 69, at 378. 
124 Shlensky, 237 N.E.2d at 777. 
125 Id. at 778. 
126 Id.  Wrigley was also allegedly motivated by his view that baseball was a “daytime 
sport.”  Id. 
127 Id. at 780. 
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considered by a director who was considering the 
patrons who would or would not attend the games if the 
park were in a poor neighborhood.  Furthermore, the 
long run interest of the corporation in its property value 
at Wrigley Field might demand all efforts to keep the 
neighborhood from deteriorating.128 
As can be seen in the Shlensky case, courts can be, and often are, 
reluctant to interfere with the decisions of the directors, even when the 
motives appear purely altruistic.129  Indeed, as will be explored later, 
many activities that appear altruistic in fact can benefit the corporation 
as well.130  Furthermore, many modern state rules, with regard to 
corporate giving, have removed the need of a court to find a business 
purpose by essentially sanctioning charitable donations and protecting 
corporate directors from scrutiny so long as their decisions are made in 
good faith.131 
In practice, corporate giving is, essentially, free of any legal 
restrictions.132  Although directors can often justify charitable donations 
128 Id.  As an aside, lights were eventually installed at Wrigley Field.  As Larry Ribstein 
and Peter Letsou note, rather sarcastically: 
The inexorable tide of progress finally brought lights to Wrigley Field 
in 1988.  The first night game was scheduled for August 8, 
1988. . . . Cub greats Billy Williams and Ernie Banks threw out the first 
pitches.  Thunderstorms accompanied by fierce dramatic lightening 
stopped the game in the fourth inning.  Speculation as to the cause of 
the storm is beyond the scope of this book. 
RIBSTEIN & LETSOU, supra note 69, at 380. 
129 Greene County Nat. Farm Loan Ass’n v. Fed. Land Bank of Louisville, 57 F. Supp. 783, 
789 (W.D. Ky. 1944); A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 586-87 (N.J. 1953) 
(holding that corporate power to make reasonable charitable contributions exists even 
apart from express statutory provisions). 
130 See infra Part IV.B. 
131 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2006) (allowing corporations to eliminate 
or limit the personal liability of a director to a corporation or stockholder for breach of 
fiduciary duty except in limited circumstances such as, inter alia, acts or omissions not in 
good faith).  Soon after Delaware enacted this statute, other states followed, and now all 
fifty states have similar provisions.  See also Duggin & Goldman, supra note 6, at 233-34; 
Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 767-68 
(2005) (noting that “[t]wenty-four states (including Delaware) authorize ‘donations for the 
public welfare or for charitable, scientific, or educational purposes.’”); Revised Model Bus. 
Corp. Act §§ 3.02(13), (15) (2002) (authorizing donations “further[ing] the business and 
affairs of the corporation,” and donations for “charitable, scientific or educational 
purposes.”). 
132 David L. Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1, 16-17 
(1979) (“As a practical matter, the business judgment defense is unlikely to fail in the 
1148 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
and the like under the business judgment rule, legal impediments are not 
their only concern.  At the end of the day, the corporation must make a 
profit.133  The individuals who run a corporation may very well wish to 
act with their own conscience but can, and often are, limited by the 
mandate that the corporation maximize shareholder wealth.134  But, is 
shareholder wealth or profit maximization necessarily a bad thing?135  
The degree to which directors should seek to maximize the profits of the 
corporation versus engaging in socially responsible behavior is the 
subject of much debate. 
2. Conscience and the Corporate Social Responsibility Debate
The corporate social responsibility (“CSR”) debate began as early as 
the 1930s,136 but has garnered much attention over the past 20 years.137  
At one far end of the debate is the view that the only responsibility 
corporate directors have is to make a profit for their shareholders.  This 
view is often represented by the economist Milton Friedman, who wrote 
that, in a free economy, “there is one and only one social responsibility of 
business–to use its resources and engage in activities designed to 
increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which 
is to say, engages in open and free competition, without deception or 
fraud.”138  The flip side of this argument is that corporations–which owe 
their very existence, including characteristics such as limited liability, to 
society–owe a reciprocal duty to non-shareholders and to society.139 
absence of conflicts of interest, extraordinary amounts of profit foregone, or some other 
affirmative suggestion of bad faith.”) (citation omitted). 
133 MITCHELL, supra note 5, at 11 (noting that “profit is essential to corporate survival”) 
(emphasis in original). 
134 Id. at 44. 
135 See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization 
Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423 (1993) (arguing that corporate 
decision makers cannot, or at the very least should not, attempt to serve the interest of two 
masters, i.e. shareholders and nonshareholders). 
136 Jill E. Fisch, The “Bad Man” Goes to Washington: The Effect of Political Influence on 
Corporate Duty, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1593, 1601 (2006) (crediting Merrick Dodd for the 
scholarly roots of the CSR discussion in 1932). 
137 Lawrence E. Mitchell, Roles of Corporations and Corporate Officers, 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 
PROC. 265, 265 (2005) (noting that the phrase CSR has only developed as an aspect of public 
debate since the early 1990s). 
138 MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962); see also Friedman, supra note 
111, at 36-38. 
139 William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 261, 265 (1992).  Allen describes two characterizations of the corporation.  The first 
is a property model, whereby the corporation is viewed as the property of the 
shareholders, and his view epitomizes the Friedman view of CSR and the corporation.  The 
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Complicating the CSR debate is that the term itself can mean 
different things.140  As Cynthia Williams has noted, “[l]egal academics 
have struggled to produce useful definitions of CSR, and in that effort 
may be well advised to look to management literature.”141  This 
management literature comprises CSR into four types, “(1) the economic 
responsibility to be profitable; (2) the legal responsibility to abide by the 
laws of society; (3) the ethical responsibility to do what is right, just, and 
fair; and (4) the philanthropic responsibility to contribute to various 
kinds of social, educational, recreational, or cultural purposes.”142  Other 
definitions are not as broad, however, and some scholars exclude from 
CSR activities that tend to benefit the corporation, even if it costs the 
corporation money in the short-term.143  Ultimately, how CSR is defined 
and whether it is right or wrong for a company to engage in CSR 
activities is not within the scope of this Article.  What is important, 
however, is what the CSR debate represents, i.e. recognition that 
corporations have the ability to choose to engage, or not engage, in 
behavior that benefits some entity, group, or individual other than just 
the corporation. 
But, returning to the initial question of whether this means 
corporations can have a conscience, do corporations engage in this 
behavior based on an internal “feeling” or “moral sense?”  Even though 
corporate managers can make decisions based on such human qualities, 
it may not be the case that what one corporate manager chooses to do is 
based on the same “moral sense” as other decision-makers within the 
company.144  And, even if those managers wish to act based on their own 
internal moral senses or feelings of what is right or wrong, as has been 
already noted above, other factors, such as making a profit, also 
influence corporate behavior.  The factors that influence corporate 
behavior will be discussed in more detail below, but with regard to 
second view is of the corporation as a social institution, “tinged with a public purpose.”  
Id.; see also Fisch, supra note 136, at 1601-02. 
140 Veronica Besmer, The Legal Character of Private Codes of Conduct: More Than Just a 
Pseudo-Formal Gloss on Corporate Social Responsibility, 2 HAST. BUS. L.J. 279, 280 (2006) 
(noting that CSR means different things to different people). 
141 Cynthia A. Williams, A Tale of Two Trajectories, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1629, 1647, n.54 
(2006). 
142 Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Dirk Matten & Andrew Crane, Corporate Citizenship: 
Toward an Extended Theoretical Conceptualization, 30 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 166, 167 (2005)). 
143 Engel, supra note 132, at 9; see also, Friedman, supra note 111, at 40-41. 
144 See Fisch, supra note 136, at 1603 (“The corporation cannot readily adopt the moral 
perspective of its individual constituents. . . . various corporate stakeholders may have 
differing moral perspectives”).  Fisch further notes that corporate managers’ ethical views 
may not mirror those of society.  Id. 
1150 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
having a conscience, it appears that a corporation is indeed without an 
internal conscience in the literal sense.  But as has already been 
discussed, corporations do make social choices and those choices are 
influenced by external factors stemming, at least in part, from the 
corporation’s status as a social entity (if we borrow from the Black’s 
definition).  So, perhaps the corporation does not have an internal 
conscience, but like Pinocchio, has an external one.  However, instead of 
Jiminy Cricket, the corporation’s “conscience” is a complex combination 
and interaction of social and market forces as well as the individual 
consciences of its corporate managers. 
B. What is “good” Corporate Behavior? 
As a conscience involves determining right from wrong, some 
definition of what is right, or, if we synonymously use the term “good,” 
what is good corporate behavior is in order.  After all, one person’s saint 
is another person’s sinner.145  Take, for example, imaginary ABC 
Corporation, which makes a decision to recognize same sex marriages 
under its benefits plan.  While the decision could certainly be justified as 
a recruiting tool, many might decry the decision as immoral or wrong 
while others would celebrate it as progressive and good.  Further, 
questions about the nature of “good” behavior are raised by activities 
that appear to be altruistic in that they do not benefit the corporation.  As 
the CSR debate demonstrates, whether corporations should even be 
delving into areas other than activities that profit the corporation is 
debated.  Given that a corporation does not have the ability to tell “right” 
from “wrong,” and as the individuals who run the company and own 
the company, i.e., management and shareholders, may have pluralistic 
moral senses giving varying answers to what is “right” and “wrong,” 
how can a corporation comport its behavior accordingly? 
If we rely on such concepts as defining a conscience, there is no way 
to reconcile a conscience and the corporation.  However, if we look at the 
end result of pressures to produce “good” behavior, we can see a theme 
of behavior that benefits some entity, person, or group other than just the 
corporation.  Thus, corporations may not know right from wrong, but 
corporations do act upon pressures to help or benefit some aspect of 
society, be it global, national, statewide, municipality, or even a smaller 
demographic or group.  So, again, if we turn to the view that a 
corporation is a social entity, based on its status as such, it can and does 
145 Friedman, supra note 111, at 40 (noting, with regard to arguments for corporate 
managers to act socially responsibly, that “one man’s good is another’s evil”). 
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comport its behavior to act, perhaps not based on what is right or wrong, 
but upon pressures to act to benefit some aspect of society other than 
itself (though not mutually exclusive of benefiting itself).  This returns us 
to the conclusion that corporations act, not based upon an internal 
conscience, but based upon an external conscience made up of many 
interacting factors. 
IV. A CATEGORICAL APPROACH TO WHAT DRIVES THE CORPORATE
CONSCIENCE 
To briefly review, we have traced the evolution of the corporation in 
the late eighteenth century from a relative few, specially chartered 
associations generally organized to complete projects for the public 
good, to the modern profit making behemoths of modern America. 
Along the way, corporations have been subjected to regulation, often in 
response to public outcry against perceived abuses of power.  This 
corporate evolution has also resulted in a general separation of 
ownership and control, though that is not to say that corporate mangers 
act completely free from external pressures such as to make a profit. 
With regard to the corporate “conscience,” while corporations do not 
have one in the traditional sense of the word, the corporation is run by 
corporate managers who can act based upon their own sense of morals, 
but that alone does not account for corporate behavior that benefits 
society as a whole.  But corporations do tend to act based upon the 
decisions of management as they interact with other factors.  I have 
broken these factors into three main categories: (1) acts that benefit 
society which are due to legal compliance; (2) acts that benefit society 
which also benefit the corporation; and (3) acts that benefit society based 
on altruistic (or semi-altruistic for those that do not believe in pure 
altruism) motives.146  I will discuss each in turn below. 
A. Compliance with the Law 
The first category involves actions that have a positive effect on 
society that are compelled by law.  Historically, we have seen 
corporations grow from a relative few with special charters that were 
146 Professor Cynthia Williams uses a similar categorical approach to explain why 
corporations engage in social responsibility initiatives.  Williams, supra note 141, at 1644.  
Professor Williams divides her explanation into four possible reasons: 1) law compliance; 2) 
market driven; 3) politically motivated; and, 4) intrinsic motivations.  Id. at 1644-46.  
Though my second category could easily be broken down into market-driven and 
politically motivated to similarly mirror Professor Williams’ approach, for the purpose of 
identifying what motivates the corporate conscience, I believe these are actually part of the 
larger category of actions beneficial to the corporation as well as society. 
1152 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
monitored by the state, to the numerous generally chartered 
organizations of today.  Along the way, corporate abuses, or at least 
perceived abuses of power, have led to reactions by the government in 
the form of laws meant to curb corporate behavior.147  Modern 
corporations are faced with a number of laws and regulations affecting 
their behavior, from environmental laws to securities regulations to 
employment laws.  While this may not seem to involve a decision of the 
conscience, in fact, compliance with the law is very much a choice.  If we 
accept that the law is generally a society-imposed form of morality–of 
what is right and wrong–then compliance represents a choice of the 
conscience.148  Though we like to think of individuals as acting in 
compliance with the law out of a sense of morality, punishment and 
deterrence certainly play a part, and, just as individuals break the law for 
a variety of reasons, so do corporations. 
One reason corporations break the law is simple: profit.149  The lure 
of profits may cause a corporation to engage in a cost-benefit analysis, 
weighing what is a small fine for what may seem like rather innocuous 
behavior against maximizing profits.150  And to a degree, it might be said 
that if society imposes too small a fine, the prohibited behavior is not 
generally deemed that bad in the first place.151  In addition to the level of 
punishment, the risk of getting caught plays a factor in a corporation’s 
willingness to violate the law.  As Daniel Ostas notes, some regulations 
“are not effectively enforced either because violators find it possible to 
147 See supra part II.B.1. 
148 Engel, supra note 132, at 37 (“If the legislature has purported to attach civil or criminal 
liability to (or to retain such liability for) a particular piece of behavior, then there is, under 
our assumptions, a public consensus that such behavior should be reduced.”); Daniel T. 
Ostas, Cooperate, Comply, or Evade? A Corporate Executive’s Social Responsibilities With Regard 
to Law, 41 AM. BUS. L.J. 559, 565 (2004) (citations omitted) (noting that under a “Public 
Interest Theory” of regulation, “[r]egulators regulate in the public interest and regulations 
reflect the aspirations of a democratic society.”). 
149 ESTES, supra note 5, at 104 (quoting former SEC chief of enforcement Stanley Sporkin 
that, “[i]n many instances where people are not lining their own pockets you can only 
explain corporate crime in terms of ‘produce or perish.’”). 
150 Ostas, supra note 148, at 573-74. 
151 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender Offers, 80 
MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1177, n.57 (1982) (“[M]anagers do not have an ethical duty to obey 
economic regulatory laws just because the laws exist.  They must determine the importance 
of these laws.  The penalties Congress names for disobedience are a measure of how much 
it wants firms to sacrifice in order to adhere to the rules . . .  managers not only may but 
also should violate the rules when it is profitable to do so.”).  But see Cynthia A. Williams, 
Corporate Compliance with the Law in the Era of Efficiency, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1265, 1266-70 (1997-
1998) (criticizing an “efficient breach” approach to regulatory law). 
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conceal their acts or because society provides insufficient resources to 
prosecute violations.”152 
An example of such conduct can be seen in the employment of illegal 
immigrants.  Under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 
fines may be imposed under Title 18 of the United States Code for 
employers knowingly employing at least ten illegal immigrants; 
employers in violation of the Code may also be imprisoned for up to five 
years.153  Despite these penalties being in place since 1986, enforcement 
has been steadily declining since then.154  As one commentator has 
pointed out, “[i]n the ten-year period from 1992 to 2002, the number of 
investigations of employers of illegal aliens declined seventy percent, 
from 7053 to 2061, on-site job arrests of illegal aliens declined from 8027 
to 451, and the fines imposed on employers declined from 1063 to 
thirteen–a staggering ninety-nine percent decrease.”155  With such scarce 
enforcement, it is easy to see how a corporation could choose to employ 
illegal immigrants at lower wages and to take the seemingly low risk of 
getting caught rather than decreasing its bottom line by having to pay 
higher wages to legal workers.156 
But even when the societal stakes should be high, corporations can 
fail to meet legal standards based on a concern for profits.  For instance, 
in the wake of a March 2005 explosion in a BP refinery in Texas City, 
Texas, BP conducted a self-audit of its process safety culture at all of its 
U.S. refineries.157  While the study was not intended to measure legal 
152 Ostas, supra note 148, at 567.  David Engel breaks corporate non-compliance with 
regulatory laws down into three reasons: 
(1) the corporate acts may not be detected; (2) the transaction costs of 
establishing liability may exceed the amount nominally due successful 
private plaintiffs or the potential benefit perceived by the public 
prosecutor; or (3) the nominal liability may bankrupt the corporation, 
in which case the rule of limited liability will protect the shareholders. 
Engel, supra note 132, at 39. 
153 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(3)(A) (2000). 
154 Hugh Alexander Fuller, Immigration,Compensation and Preemption: The Proper Measure 
of  Lost Future Earning Capacity Damages After Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 
58 BAYLOR L. REV. 985, 1003 (2006) (citing Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Who Left the 
Door Open?, TIME, Sept. 20, 2004, at 51, 52); Bob Herbert, Who’s Getting the New Jobs,  N.Y. 
TIMES, July 23, 2004, at A23; Louis Uchitelle, I.N.S. Is Looking the Other Way As Illegal 
Immigrants Fill Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, March 9, 2000, at C1. 
155 See Fuller, supra note 154, at 1003. 
156 See id. (noting that “penalties will not deter illegal immigration if they are never 
imposed.”). 
157 THE REPORT OF THE BP REFINERIES SAFETY REVIEW PANEL 17 (January 2007) (on file 
with author).  [In the interest of full academic disclosure, the author, in his previous 
employment, briefly worked on portions of the independent safety review that was the 
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compliance or to assess the causes of the Texas City explosion,158 the 
results of some of the surveys of employees give interesting insights into 
the perception of where BP’s primary concerns were with regard to 
safety processes, which can certainly implicate legal requirements.  For 
instance, in response to a question regarding whether process safety was 
compromised by short-term financial goals, thirty percent of the Texas 
City refinery operators and forty-five percent of a Toledo, Ohio refinery’s 
operators said it was compromised.159  Similarly, thirty-three percent of 
Texas City operators and forty-two percent of Toledo operators agreed 
that process safety was secondary to achieving production goals.160  
While these numbers are by no means a majority of the employees, it 
represents a significant portion of people with an inside view “from the 
trenches” so to speak,161 and demonstrates how the financial bottom line 
could affect a corporation’s cultural attitude toward compliance. 
The above discussion has focused on decisions to comply or not 
comply with the law.  However, corporations can also flirt with non-
compliance by acting in the gray areas of the law.  “Loopholes” in the 
law may allow corporations to comply with the letter, if not the spirit, of 
a law, or vague language in a law may leave a regulation open to a 
variety of interpretations which a corporation might abuse.162  This has 
led to what some have termed “[c]reative compliance” with the law, i.e., 
the ability to legally achieve the same ends as criminal action by 
manipulating and exploiting the legal system.163  This area presents an 
interesting cross-road for the corporate conscience, as it does not deal 
basis of this report, but took no part in the formulation, dissemination, or review of the 
survey questions cited.] 
158 Id. at 14. 
159 Id. at 64. 
160 Id. at 65.  Similar numbers were also reported for maintenance/craft technicians.  Id. at 
64-65.  The surveys covered three other refineries in Whiting, Indiana, Cherry Point, 
Oregon, and Carson, California.  Id.  The results for these refineries were much more 
favorable to BP’s commitment to process safety.  Id.  However, contractors tended to have a 
much less favorable view of BP’s commitment to process safety, with 39-60 percent 
agreeing that production goals took precedence over process safety.  Id. 
161 Management uniformly answered the question more favorably to BP’s commitment to 
process safety.  Id.  However, the report’s ultimate conclusion was that “BP has not 
adequately established process safety as a core value across its five U.S. refineries.”  Id. at 
65. 
162 Ostas, supra note 148, at 567.  Ostas notes a fundamental difference between 
compliance with the law and cooperation with the law, stating that “compliance embodies 
a less expansive duty than does cooperation.  At its heart, the distinction highlights the 
difference between the letter and the spirit of the law.  One complies with the letter of the 
law; one cooperates with the law’s spirit.”  Id. at 566. 
163 Doreen McBarnet, After Enron Will “Whiter Than White Collar Crime” Still Wash?, 46 
BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1091, 1092 (2006). 
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with out-and-out illegality, but rather with a decision to not only comply 
with the letter of the law but to also cooperate with the spirit of the 
law.164 
The accounting scandal that precipitated Enron’s collapse provides 
an excellent example of “creative compliance.”  One of the keys to 
Enron’s ability to state such high profits was its use of mark-to-market 
accounting.  Under normal accounting methods, revenue recognition 
occurs after a service has been provided (or mostly provided) and 
payment has been received.165  Under the mark-to-market accounting 
method, however, Enron was able to recognize revenue even before a 
service was provided, allowing Enron “to report expected benefits from 
future transactions into current period income.”166  Enron coupled the 
mark-to-market accounting with an aggressive interpretation of what 
constituted trades, adopting a “merchant model” of revenues.167  Under 
the “merchant model,” an entity, such as a retailer, could account for the 
entire selling price of products in their possession because they are 
deemed to take the risk of selling the goods in their possession.168  Enron 
used this model to account for the entire selling price of its energy 
trades, rather than just accounting for the trading or brokerage fees as 
was customary.169  Despite the potential for abuse in such accounting 
practices, Enron had actually obtained approval from the SEC to use the 
mark-to-market accounting method in January of 1992.170  The result, 
however, was that Enron reported “enormously inflated performance, 
high share values, otherwise unsustainable credit ratings and huge 
recompense for executives in both performance related pay and share 
options.”171 
164 Ostas, supra note 148, at 566.  Another interesting twist on this concept involves the 
corporation’s ability to influence the law.  Fisch, supra note 136, at 1604-05.  Through 
political influence, corporations have the ability to change laws with which they do not 
want to comply.  Id. at 1610. 
165 Bala G. Dharan & William R. Bufkins, Red Flags in Enron’s Reporting of Revenues and 
Key Financial Measures, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 102 (Nancy 
B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004). 
166 Id. at 101-02. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 103. 
169 Id.  The accounting for just the brokerage fee of the trade is known as the “agent 
model” because  an “‘agent’ is someone who provides a service to the customer (such as 
facilitating the purchase of an airline ticket), but does not really take up the risks of 
possession and the risks of collection.”  Id. 
170 Id. at 104. 
171 McBarnet, supra note 163, at 1095; Dharan & Bufkins, supra note 165, at 103 (estimating 
that revenues were increased as much as fifty times through use of these accounting 
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As can be seen from the examples above, the mere fact that actions 
are compelled by the law does not mean that they are devoid of a choice. 
Profit weighs a clear role in the decisions of some corporations to engage 
in, or refrain from, illegal activities.  Though some may argue that a cost-
benefit analysis is appropriate with regard to legal compliance, it would 
be difficult to fault a corporation for choosing compliance.  Even Milton 
Friedman has caveated that the responsibility of businessmen to make as 
much money as possible is to be done “while conforming to the basic 
rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in 
ethical custom.”172  And even when a corporation is practicing “creative 
compliance,” as in the Enron example above, the spirit of the law may be 
broken by doing what is not arguably illegal, but still in violation of the 
underlying rules of society embodied in ethical custom. 
B. Acts that Benefit both Society and the Corporation 
This category includes behavior that has a positive effect on society 
but that also benefits the corporation.  At the most basic level, most 
charitable donations tend to fall in this category.173  Corporations are 
eligible for a tax deduction on the donations, reaping the benefits of 
good public relations with a relatively small output of money when 
compared to the company’s net profits.  However, though a large 
donation of the corporation’s profits would likely not be worth the tax 
deduction or the benefits from positive public relations, few corporations 
give more than a very small percentage of their profits to charity,174 
despite the Federal Tax Code allowing for a deduction for up to ten 
percent.175 
Some corporate giving also contains an ulterior motive beyond the 
obvious benefits to the corporation and goodwill obtained.  Again, Enron 
provides a good example of the motives behind charitable donations. 
methods).  Of course, Enron involved much more than mere creative compliance to 
maximize shareholder profits, as there was also a large degree of self-dealing. 
172 Friedman, supra note 111, at 37. 
173 Rikki Abzug & Natalie J. Webb, Rational and Extra-Rational Motivations for Corporate 
Giving: Complementing Economic Theory with Organization Science, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 
1035, 1039 (1997) (noting that “economists tend to believe that nearly all donations benefit 
the corporation in some way.”) (citation omitted). 
174 SPECIAL REPORT: PHILANTHROPY 2005, Smarter Corporate Giving, BUSINESS WEEK, 
November 28, 2005, at 72 (noting that giving in 2004 by corporations equaled 1.2 percent of 
total corporate profits, which was the average for the previous forty years).  Corporate 
giving in the United States in 2006 reportedly only accounted for 4.3 percent of the total 
contributions made to charities in 2006, while 75.6 percent came from individuals.  Report: 
Most U.S. giving done by individuals, CINCINNATI BUS. COUR., June 25, 2007. 
175 I.R.C. § 170(b)(2) (2006). 
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Despite its other questionable dealings, Enron was known for its charity, 
annually disbursing one percent of its pretax earnings to worthy causes, 
which totaled $12 million in 2001.176  Enron’s giving was so extensive 
that, after its fall, many of the beneficiaries of its generosity, including 
the United Way, YMCA, and local Houston arts and theater programs, 
felt its absence.177  While Enron’s charity benefited the community, there 
was also a benefit to Enron; the most obvious benefit being the goodwill 
and positive public relations Enron enjoyed as a good “corporate 
citizen.”  Also, as noted above, such donations would provide a tax 
deduction, but there may have also been a more sinister motive behind 
Enron’s largesse.  Following Enron’s fall, many questioned whether 
Enron was giving money, both to charitable organizations as well as 
political contributions, to avoid closer scrutiny of its operations.178  
Viewed cynically, Enron’s generosity was intended to influence people 
with the power to help or hurt the company.179  As accounting professor 
Ralph Estes surmised, “[m]ost of the rationale is that somehow it will 
pay off on the bottom line . . . It’s calculated to pay a dividend, and these 
actions can keep the wolves from the door.”180  In other words, the 
benefit gained by charitable activities, whether it be through a reduction 
in the costs of defending the corporation’s actions before the 
government, an avoidance of governmental regulations, or a reduction in 
property damage at the hands of activists, makes-up for or exceeds the 
costs to the corporation.181 
176 Allan Turner, Enron’s Fall Shakes Up Nonprofit Community, HOUS. CHRON., Dec. 7, 2001, 
at A1. 
177 Id.  (collecting accounts of Enron’s corporate giving as well as the efforts of its 
individual employees). 
178 Alan Clendenning, Critics Question Enron’s Charitable Donations: Company and Lay 
Contributed to Wide Range of Causes, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 27, 2002, at A4. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. (quoting Dr. Ralph Estes, accounting professor emeritus at American University). 
181 NEIL H. JACOBY, CORPORATE POWER AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE 
FUTURE 194-97 (1973). 
Rational enterprise managers judge the yield of outlays for social 
purposes by their long-run effect upon profits.  They measure the 
return on the “investment” in each social program.  Each social outlay 
is tested by a cost/benefit analysis.  Among the benefits may be a 
reduction in the costs of defending the firm’s actions before the 
legislative or executive agencies of government, an avoidance of 
onerous governmental regulations, or a reduction in property damage 
at the hands of activists.  Social pressures generate costs, the amount of 
which can be minimized by appropriate corporate outlays. 
Id. at 196. 
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Other than charitable donations, corporations have developed a 
number of other ways to help society while adding to the company’s 
bottom line and/or reputation.  For instance, one modern trend is the 
integration of marketing campaigns for products with prominent 
charities or social causes.182  A small sampling of such ventures was 
recounted in November of 2006 in The New York Times: 
Saks Fifth Avenue is selling a leather jacket from 
Kenneth Cole this holiday season for $795, and a 
percentage of the sales price will be donated to Help 
USA, a group that fights homelessness. 
Bath & Body Works is selling an Elton John scented 
candle for $16.50, with 10 percent of each sale, or $2, 
going to the Elton John AIDS Foundation. 
Gap, Apple Computer and Motorola are offering 
limited-edition red-colored products to benefit the AIDS 
charity (Product) RED.  Gap gives 50 percent of the 
profits from sales; Apple gives $10 for each iPod Nano; 
and Motorola $17 for each phone.183 
The RED campaign is an excellent example of this trend and of 
corporate behavior that has a positive effect on society while benefiting 
the corporation.  The Red campaign is the brain child of musician Bono 
and California politician Bobby Shriver.184  The concept is simple: 
manufacturers make product lines tied to the Red campaign, for instance 
a red Motokrzr phone, and give a portion of the profits to the Global 
182 Craig and Marc Kielburger, Cause-tied Marketing Not Perfect, TORONTO STAR, July 16, 
2007, at World and Comment (noting that cause-related marketing is an “increasingly 
effective way to reach savvy consumers.”); John Hall Scripps, Firm, Non-profits Both Benefit 
From Cause Marketing, FORT WAYNE J. GAZETTE, July 13, 2007, at 3E; Michael Barbaro, 
Candles, Jeans, Lipsticks: Products With Ulterior Motives, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2006, at F33 
(“[R]etailers across the country are putting philanthropy at the center of their product lines, 
whether it is clothes, books or shoes.”).  Michael E. Porter and Mark R. Kramer have 
described corporations’ attempts at creating value for both society and themselves as a 
“shared value[,]” stating: “The essential test that should guide [corporate social 
responsibility] is not whether a cause is worthy but whether it presents an opportunity to 
create shared value—that is, a meaningful benefit for society that is also valuable to the 
business.”  Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, The Link Between Competitive Advantage and 
Corporate Social Resposnibility, HARV. BUS. REV., HBR Spotlight, Dec. 2006, at 8. 
183 Barbaro, supra note 182, at F33. 
184 Louise Story, Want to Help Treat AIDS in Africa? Buy a Cellphone, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 
2006, at C8. 
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Fund to Fight AIDS.185  The idea is that, rather than a one-time charitable 
donation, because the companies are making a profit from the sale of the 
RED products, the donations will be sustained.186  Participants include 
Gap, Armani Exchange, Motorola, Converse, Apple, and American 
Express.187  There have, however, been some concerns raised over the 
transparency of the donations in the RED campaign,188 and while the 
concept seems sound, time will tell whether abuses destroy the public 
benefit to such campaigns. 
The move by many corporations to go “green” (adopt 
environmentally friendly practices) often offers another example of 
actions that benefit society and the corporation.  Corporations that offer 
“green” products or services hope to cash-in on an environmentally 
conscious consumer base.189  Additionally, as with the RED campaign, 
corporations get the public relations benefit of claiming they are helping 
the environment.190  But, the “green” movement goes beyond appealing 
to the consumer’s desire to help the environment. Many corporations see 
a benefit in energy savings themselves.191  For instance, a standard 
feature in new Wal-Marts is to have a series of skylights in the roof to 
reduce energy costs for lighting.192  Such “green” construction is seen as 
a way many companies can reduce the environmental impacts of 
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
187 Id.; Barbaro, supra note 182, at F33. 
188 Scripps, supra note 182, at 3E (noting concerns over transparency in accounting and 
how the proceeds of products are funneled to the Global Fund).  Cf. Kielburger, supra note 
182, at 2 (noting that the campaign has spent over four times as much in advertising than it 
has raised). 
189 Paul Davidson, Getting Gold Out of Green: Companies Learn Eco-friendliness Helps Bottom 
Line, USA TODAY, April 19, 2007, at 7A. 
190 This has led to some concerns that corporations are “‘greenwashing,’ or using 
environmentalism to polish their corporate images.”  Id.  Consumers concerned over the 
climate-friendliness of companies can obtain a global scorecard which ranks companies 
based, among other things, on “what they have done to reduce their impact on the climate, 
[and] their stances on global-warming legislation.”  MSNBC News Services, Companies Get 
Ranked on Global Warming: Canon, Nike Among the Best; Apple, eBay, Levi Strauss Among 
Worst, June 19, 2007, available at https://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19315109/ (describing it 
as a “pocket-sized scorecard produced by a new nonprofit, Climate Counts, and based on 
22 criteria developed with help from experts.”). 
191 Id.; Daniel Franklin, A change in climate; The greening of corporate responsibility, in Just 
good business: A special report on corporate social responsibility, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 19, 2008, 
at 14 (“Beyond the lofty talk, reducing a company’s output of greenhouse gasses and 
encouraging ‘responsible’ use of resources can also mean cutting waste and saving 
money.”); Jim Downing, Go Green to Save Some Green; Wal-Mart Seeks Ways to Cut Electricity 
Usage, FORT WAYNE J. GAZETTE, April 30, 2007, at 4C. 
192 Downing, supra note 191, at 4C. 
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operations.193  Other companies are reducing their impact and saving 
money through other means, such as Marriott Hotel’s use of compact 
fluorescent light bulbs to save 65% on hotel lighting costs.194  Beyond the 
benefits to the corporation in energy savings and to public relations, 
some states have also created incentives for environmentally friendly 
corporations.195  For instance, Wisconsin has enacted “Green Tier” 
legislation, which is designed to promote “superior environmental 
performance” by businesses.196  The Wisconsin legislation creates a two-
tier market-based incentive program for environmentally responsible 
businesses.197  Also, on the federal level, the U.S. has given tax credits in 
the past to renewable-energy producers, though the failure to renew the 
credit in some years has made the credit unpredictable.198  Still, there is a 
general consensus among many that a federal level of control is 
inevitable, be it through incentives or strict controls.199  Even such federal 
controls have the potential to create big business, however, in the form of 
carbon credits, i.e., credits that can be bought on the open market that are 
awarded to businesses for the tons of carbon dioxide that are not 
emitted.200  Such legislation would provide another potential money 
making angle for corporations that choose to go “green.”201 
193 Brian D. Anderson, Legal and Business Issues of Green Building, 79 WIS. LAW. 10, 11 
(2006); Rick Rothacker, Environmentally Friendly Projects: Buildings growing Wachovia, BofA 
part of push to cut the ecological impact of doing business, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, May 2, 2007, at 
1D. 
194 Davidson, supra note 189, at 7A. 
195 See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 299.83 (2007) (setting out Green Tier legislation intended to create 
incentives for businesses with superior environmental performance).  Similarly, Oregon 
has established a Green Permits program which offers reduced inspection frequency, 
among other benefits, as an incentive to encourage firms to adopt an environmental 
management system. OR. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, THE OREGON GREEN PERMITS PROGRAM 
GUIDE 4-1 (2000). 
196 WIS. STAT. § 299.83; Linda H. Bochert & Mary Woolsey Schlaefer, Achieving 
Environmental Excellence: Green Tier Legislation, 78 WIS. LAW. 8, 9 (2005). 
197 Bochert & Schlafer, supra note 196, at 9. 
198 Sunlit Uplands: Wind and Solar Power are Flourishing,Tthanks to Subsidies, THE 
ECONOMIST, June 2, 2007, in Cleaning up: A Special Report on Business and Climate Change, at 
16-19. 
199 Everybody’s Green Now: How America’s Big Companies Got Environmentalism, THE 
ECONOMIST, June 2, 2007, in Cleaning up: A Special Report on Business and Climate Change, at 
6. 
200 Trading Thin Air: The Carbon Market is Working, but not Bringing Forth as Much 
Innovation as had Been Hoped, THE ECONOMIST, June 2, 2007, in Cleaning up: A Special Report 
on Business and Climate Change, at 8. 
201 Of course, any compulsory legislation would belong in the first category.  I have 
included “green” legislation in the second category only to the degree that it is incentive 
based as opposed to compulsory. 
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In all of the situations described above, however, the question must 
be asked: if there is a benefit to the corporation, why is this even a 
choice?  After all, it would seem that if choosing to pair with the RED 
campaign or to switch all of your business’s light bulbs over to compact 
fluorescent light bulbs will save or make your business money, then why 
isn’t everyone doing this? What sort of choice is being made?  Again, 
turning a profit, even if just in the short-term, can be an obstacle.  Many 
corporate managers feel pressure to make short-term earnings. 
According to a survey conducted by authors Dominic Dodd and Ken 
Favaro for their book, The Three Tensions, “nearly two-thirds (63 percent) 
of the managers in our survey said that the capital markets are biased 
toward short-term earnings.”202  Thus, if a venture requires a large up-
front outlay of capital, such as some energy-saving steps, or if the return 
is speculative, it is understandable how some corporate managers might 
delay or decline to enter into such ventures.203 
C. Altruistic (or Semi-Altruistic) Acts 
The third and final category involves corporate behavior that 
benefits society and is initiated by altruistic motives.  Of course, the very 
term “altruistic” can be controversial.  The term “altruism” means an 
“unselfish concern for the welfare of others.”204  However, it could be 
argued that no action, be it by a corporation or an individual, is 
completely unselfish.205  However, it is not the purpose of this Article to 
enter into such a philosophical debate, and so, for the purposes of this 
Article, I will use the term more loosely to cover behavior that is 
motivated by something other than a solid and foreseeable benefit to the 
corporation. 
Even given this broad definition, it can be hard to categorize 
corporate behavior as “altruistic.”  As has already been noted, corporate 
managers are influenced and pressured to maximize profit.  Some 
privately held corporations, however, have made altruistic behavior a 
part of their corporate culture.  This is often initiated by specific persons 
202 DOMINIC DODD & KEN FAVARO, THE THREE TENSIONS 71 (2007). 
203 Id. at 72 (noting that, of those surveyed, 27 percent often, and 54 percent sometimes, 
cut spending on R&D, marketing, or IT to safeguard short-term earnings and 13 percent 
often, and 64 percent sometimes, delayed a project, even if it would be profitable for the 
same reason). 
204 WEBSTER’S UNIVERSAL COLLEGE DICTIONARY (1997). 
205 Indeed, a recent study suggests that undertaking unselfish acts releases chemicals in 
the brain that activate some of the same pleasure centers in your brain as food and sex.  To 
your brain, altruism’s as good as sex: Even paying taxes can trigger pleasure centers, study says, 
REUTERS, June 14, 2007, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19235071/. 
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within the organizations that have taken stands based on their own 
beliefs as to how a corporation should behave. These specific persons, in 
effect, act as individual “Jiminy Crickets” for the corporation.  For 
instance, an example many a hungry fast-food fan is aware of is that 
Chik-fil-A is not open on Sundays.206  The reason: Chik-fil-A’s founder 
and chairman, S. Truett Cathy, is a devout Christian.207  His beliefs have 
led him never to have his businesses open on Sundays, “a time in the 
quick service industry that normally generates 20 percent of revenue.”208  
While the company also admits that it is a useful incentive in hiring and 
retaining employees,209 it is clear that the real motivation is S. Truett 
Cathy’s desire to worship and glorify his God.  As Mr. Cathy expressed 
in response to a question about what he would like his greatest legacy to 
the organization to be: 
I think the greatest contribution would be the fact that 
we’re closed on Sunday.  We’ve done that for 60 years. 
And there are times when you mention Chick-fil-A, 
yeah, that’s the place that’s closed on Sundays.  And it 
gives us opportunity to explain well sure, you can’t go 
eat at Chick-fil-A because they’re closed on Sunday to 
respect the Lord’s Day.  ‘Honor the Lord’s Day and keep 
it holy.’  It’s a special day that the Lord has given Man. 
We need that day off, it’s to honor God. We just need a 
day off to think about the little things that are important. 
And that’s the bottom line.210 
206 See Chik-fil-A, corporate website, http://www.chik-fil-a.com/Closed.asp (last visited 
March 23, 2008). 
207 Miles Davis & Leyland M. Lucas, Principle before Profits: An Interview with S. Truett 
Cathy, NEW ENGLAND J. OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, April 1, 2007, at 27; Thuy-Doan Le, A Day of 
Rest: Religious Choice May Sacrifice Sales but Build Customer Loyalty, THE SACRAMENTO BEE, 
April 15, 2006, at D1. 
208 Davis & Leyland, supra note 207, at 27; Ben Werner, Chik-fil-A Founder Shares his 
Philosophy, THE COLUMBIA (SC) STATE, April 18, 2007. 
209 Le, supra note 207. 
210 Davis & Leyland, supra note 207, at 31.  Interestingly, when asked about corporate 
social responsibility and whether the responsibility of a corporate manager is to the 
stockholders or shareholders, Mr. Cathy responded: 
You should be honest to your stockholders.  Look at it the way they 
practice in the Navy where the captain’s always the last one to depart 
from the ship.  If you got a sinking ship, it is the captain who leaves 
last.  I felt that in business it’s the same way, you got to be responsible 
to the stockholders–unlike a business owner I heard about.  He took 
his money and left the company in bad shape.  He shouldn’t have 
walked off, leaving his business in trouble.  He did all he could to 
leave the scene.  You should take care of the stockholders, those who 
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Thus, though there may be some incidental benefits to the decision 
to close on Sundays, the real motivation behind the decision is not a 
profit or benefit seeking motive, but rather a religiously based decision. 
Ben & Jerry’s ice cream offers another example of a corporation that 
has engaged in behavior for reasons other than profit.211  Ben & Jerry’s 
was started by Ben Cohen and Jerry Greenfield in Burlington, Vermont, 
in 1978.212  From its inception, Ben & Jerry’s used milk from local dairy 
farmers that was grown hormone-free and partnered early-on with non-
profit organizations to offer job training to disadvantaged people.213  In 
addition, Ben & Jerry’s set up a compensation plan through which all 
staff earned at least twenty percent of the salary of the highest paid 
employee and committed 7.5 percent of its pre-tax profits to 
philanthropic causes.214  Even though Ben & Jerry’s was bought by food 
giant Unilever in 2000, the deal included a promise by Unilever to keep 
in place Ben & Jerry’s corporate philanthropic philosophy as well as to 
commit a percentage of profits to charity.215  And since the takeover, Ben 
& Jerry’s still boasts that the company’s annual reports continue to 
“evaluate achievement on social and environmental goals, including 
assessments by an external auditor.”216 
That is not to say that only privately held corporations can fall into 
this category.  For instance, Robert Galvin, a former senior officer with 
Motorola, described an instance where his company forfeited profits 
invest their life savings in it and trust in the company.  They shouldn’t 
be disappointed by the person they’re trusting in, with mistake and no 
protection really, but that’s the stock market.  But it gets back to 
biblical principles.  Treat others like you like to be treated, be honest 
and be truthful.  These are the basic things that are expected of an 
individual. 
Id. at 30. 
211 EMILY ROSS & ANGUS HOLLAND, 100 GREAT BUSINESSES AND THE MINDS BEHIND THEM 
353 (Sourcebooks, Inc. 2006) (2004) (noting that Ben & Jerry’s is the first company to make a 
profit while acting like a non-profit organization). 
212 Id. 
213 Id. at 353-55. 
214 Id. at 355.  Ben & Jerry’s also “set up all manner of revenue streams into nonprofit 
activities . . . [and] offered staff extended maternity and paternity leave and allowances for 
de facto and gay couples.”  Id. 
215 Id. at 355-56.  According to Ben & Jerry’s website, it donates “over $1.1 million” a year 
to charity and donated $1.6 million in 2006.  See http://www.benjerry.com/foundation/ 
(last visited March 23, 2008); see also Company Profile for Ben & Jerry’s, March 30, 2007, 
available at http://www.benjerry.com/our_company/press_center/press/. 
216 50 for History, HR MAGAZINE, Dec. 1, 2005, at 10. 
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based upon principles of integrity and respect for other people.217  His 
anecdote recalls an instance around 1950 when Motorola had the 
opportunity to enter into a microwave contract with a South American 
government.218  The contract would have meant a significant, but not 
enormous, increase in the company’s profit margin.219  However, it came 
to the company’s attention that the South American government was 
trying to play footloose with where the money was going, and it was 
suspected that the contract would ultimately result in cash being 
funneled to some of that country’s generals.220  Motorola refused to enter 
into the contract and, furthermore, according to Galvin, would never 
solicit that government again, despite the profit that could be made.221 
But, does this anecdote really represent an instance of altruistic 
behavior?  Galvin admits that, though the company did not take that 
contract, it “made so much more money honorably over the next twenty 
years while [the] anecdote was still fresh in people’s minds,”222 
indicating that the reputation boost and subsequent positive effect it had 
on the company’s bottom line was worth any short-term profit they 
could have made by entering into a contract with a corrupt government. 
So does this sort of conduct really belong in the previous category? 
Perhaps not; according to Galvin, Motorola’s decision, or perhaps more 
accurately, the decision of its officers, was not based on what was 
profitable or legal but on what the company held as a core value of right 
and wrong.223 
Another company that has recently made headlines with its 
seemingly progressive corporate culture is American Apparel, Inc. which 
specializes in selling T-shirts.224  American Apparel’s claim to fame is 
that all of its merchandise is manufactured in Los Angeles, California, 
217 Robert W. Galvin, Corporate Social Responsibility is Not a Challenge, in IS THE GOOD 
CORPORATION DEAD? SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 254 (John W. Houck & 
Oliver F. Williams eds., 1996). 
218 Id. 
219 Id. at 255. 
220 Id. at 254-55.  This occurred prior to enactment of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act 
(“FCPA”).  Id. at 258; 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2 (2006). 
221 Galvin, supra note 217, at 255. 
222 Id. 
223 Id. at 258.  Galvin notes that although the conduct in question in the anecdote would 
now be illegal, he believes that the legality was irrelevant because, as he puts it, “I know 
right from wrong and practice what is right, regardless of the law.”  Id. 
224 American Apparel, http://americanapparel.net/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2008) (American 
Apparel, Inc. trades on the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) as APP). 
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rather than overseas.225  American Apparel’s founder, Dov Charney, has 
made it his company’s goal to prove that T-shirts can be made profitably 
in the U.S.A. while still paying a decent wage and maintaining good 
working conditions.226  Indeed, American Apparel has not just settled for 
manufacturing in the U.S., but also has offered benefits beyond a 
“decent” wage.  Along with workers averaging $12.50 an hour,227 
American Apparel offers a number of perks such as health insurance, 
paid vacations, free English classes (the workers are predominantly 
Hispanic), subsidized bus passes, lunches, legal assistance as well as 
yoga, massage, and counseling.228  American Apparel has planned to 
begin a stock plan under which the average employee would receive 540 
shares in the company.229  This is all part of Charney’s vision to present a 
“sweatshop free” product which has reaped rewards for the company.230  
American Apparel reported $80 million in sales in 2003231 and that 
number grew to $300 million in 2006.232 
The sweatshop-free vision is more than just an altruistic tag-line, 
however; it is also the heart of American Apparel’s business model.  By 
keeping manufacturing in the U.S., Charney claims he is better able to 
respond to market demands as well as ensure quality control.233  The 
generous pay and benefits also helps attract workers.  As Charney 
himself has noted, “It’s not a marketing ploy, necessarily, it’s about 
taking care of people that are taking care of the company.  And it’s also a 
capitalistic ploy, because they can say:  ‘Well, you know, someone works 
at another factory, they make $2 less or $5 less an hour,’ and they’re ‘Oh, 
225 SUZANNE BERGER, HOW WE COMPETE: WHAT COMPANIES AROUND THE WORLD ARE 
DOING TO MAKE IT IN TODAY’S GLOBAL ECONOMY 201-02 (2006); Rob Walker, Conscience 
Undercover, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2004, at Section 6, p. 18; CBS Sunday Morning (CBS 
television broadcast Feb. 4, 2007) (Interview by John Blackstone with Dov Charney, creator 
of American Apparel company). 
226 BERGER, supra note 225, at 203. 
227 Id. at 202; Walker, supra note 225 (quoting a $13 per hour wage). 
228 BERGER, supra note 225, at 202-03; Linda Baker, Made in the U.S. of A.?, SALON, Feb. 11, 
2004. 
229 CBS Sunday Morning (CBS television broadcast Feb. 4, 2007) (Interview by John 
Blackstone with Dov Charney, creator of American Apparel company). 
230 BERGER, supra note 225, at 203. American Apparel Registers Record-Breaking Sales, BUS. 
WIRE, Dec. 10, 2002. 
231 Jenny Strasburg, Made in the U.S.A., SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., July 4, 2004, at Business 
J1. 
232 CBS Sunday Morning: To aT, (CBS television broadcast Feb. 4, 2007) (Interview by 
John Blackstone with Dov Charney, creator of American Apparel company). 
233 Id.; see also BERGER, supra note 225, at 203; Marisa Katz, Millionaire in a T-shirt, Israel 
Business Arena, Nov. 16, 2004 (noting that Charney briefly outsourced in the beginning to 
Mexico but that the quality control created issues that off-set the savings in cheaper labor). 
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at American Apparel, you have medical insurance.’”234  The sweatshop 
free tagline has also been a marketing point itself, which may be a large 
part of the company’s success.235  Thus, as with the Motorola example 
above, the corporate behavior may have its genesis in an altruistic or 
semi-altruistic motive.  Ultimately, it is the concept’s profitability that 
makes it sustainable.  As Charney himself has noted, “If you’ve got a 
company where everybody wins, that company will be around for 
awhile.”236 
D. Blurring the Lines 
As the Motorola anecdote and American Apparel business model 
demonstrate, it is often difficult to identify the main motivating factor 
behind corporate behavior that is beneficial to society.  Though the 
Federal Corrupt Practices Act was not yet in place, Motorola may have 
felt it was treading into a gray legal area, or at least one that could 
eventually cause it legal headaches.  Additionally, as Galvin noted, the 
corporation saw a long-term benefit based on refraining to do business. 
American Apparel is motivated to provide a sweatshop free product, but 
that same tagline has helped sell the shirts and thus made the product 
profitable.  Identifying what motivates such corporate behavior is 
difficult without more information from the companies themselves,237 
and even then, we may be suspect of their explanations, which may be 
nothing more than a public relations spin.  On the other hand, corporate 
managers may be doing the opposite, attempting to offer legitimate 
beneficial results for the corporation to justify their own desire to engage 
in altruistic behavior.238 
In reflecting upon the above factors, it is important to note that they 
are just that, factors.  They very well may not be mutually exclusive, but 
234 CBS Sunday Morning (CBS television broadcast Feb. 4, 2007) (Interview by John 
Blackstone with Dov Charney, creator of American Apparel company). 
235 Id.; BERGER, supra note 225, at 202-03; Strasburg, supra note 231; Shannon McMahon, 
Made in Downtown L.A.; American Apparel’s progressive practices winning over customers, SAN 
DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Dec. 18, 2004, at Business, C-1 (“American Apparel’s socially 
conscious vibe is still what first strikes a chord with consumers.”). 
236 McMahon, supra note 235 (quoting Dov Charney). 
237 As Professor Williams notes in discussing her own categorical approach to CSR 
initiatives, “[d]istinguishing between these explanations is difficult without access to 
information about companies’ internal decision-making processes, which will require more 
in-depth interviews and case studies; there are undoubtedly multiple explanations for this 
relatively new phenomenon.”  Williams, supra note 141, at 1647. 
238 Abzug & Webb, supra note 173, at 1041 (noting that, with regard to giving, because 
managers cannot separate their individual interests from occupational decision-making, 
managers “may maximize their own utility”). 
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rather, interact in a complex way to produce socially beneficial corporate 
behaviors.  And while examples have been used to try and identify 
behaviors based upon driving factors, it is certainly open for debate 
whether, and to what degree, a corporate behavior is based upon one of 
the mentioned categories. 
V.  JUDGING THE CORPORATE CONSCIENCE 
It is tempting, when looking at the above categories, to use them as a 
checklist for good corporate behavior.  For instance, if a corporation is 
generally abiding by the laws and occasionally donating money to 
charity, then it could be concluded that the corporation is acting as an 
acceptable corporate citizen, even if it does not engage in altruistic acts. 
Just as individual citizen John Doe, who generally abides by the law 
(though we would probably tend to forgive the errant minor violation 
such as a traffic ticket) and who occasionally gives money to a local 
charity, but enjoys the tax write-off, could be deemed a good citizen. 
However, I believe such an approach over-simplifies the analysis. 
Continuing with the John Doe example, Doe, a single unattached man, 
could also be having an affair with his best friend’s fiancé.  Many would 
consider this rather morally reprehensible, though completely legal. 
Corporations can also engage in behavior that, though legal, can be seen 
as immoral and affect our view of their corporate citizenship.  Returning 
to the example of the corporation that chooses to recognize same sex 
partnerships, whether the corporation is considered to have made a right 
or wrong choice is a highly individualized question. 
This is not to say that the factors are useless in evaluating corporate 
behavior.  Quite the contrary, someone may well look at a situation and 
make his or her own determination of what the motivating factor should 
be behind socially beneficial actions.  Law and economics proponents 
may well argue that no corporate act should be based on the altruistic 
category, while proponents of CSR will likely promote decision-making 
based in that same category (though perhaps not exclusively).  But 
whatever the moral base of the individual judging corporate behavior, 
understanding what motivates corporate behavior is important in 
understanding how to change or curb corporate behavior. 
VI. CONCLUSION
The corporation has evolved extensively from its roots in America as 
a specially chartered association organized to accomplish some public 
good, to the modern profit-making entities of today.  Along the way, 
1168 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
abuses of corporate power, whether real or perceived, have resulted in 
regulations aimed at curbing corporate behavior.  Furthermore, the 
separation of ownership from control in the corporation, articulated in 
the Berle-Means thesis, has led to debates over the roles and duties of 
corporate managers.  This has helped to shape the debate over whether, 
and to what degree, corporate managers should cause the corporation to 
engage in socially beneficial behaviors. 
Though these individuals who run the corporation have a conscience 
(arguably as human beings), the corporation itself does not have one in 
the traditional sense of the word.  The corporation is an artificial entity, 
soulless and devoid of the ability to reflect upon its actions.  However, 
like the wooden boy, Pinocchio, corporate behavior is directed by its 
own Jiminy Cricket, i.e. external factors.  These external factors of legal 
compliance, corporate benefit and even altruism (even if it is manifested 
through a controlling corporate manager), often act in conjunction to 
produce corporate behaviors that ultimately benefit some aspect of 
society.  While more empirical research is needed to understand to what 
degree each of these factors affects corporate behaviors, through 
understanding these factors, we may begin to understand why 
corporations act as they do and how corporate behaviors may be curbed 
in the future. 
